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Judicial Intervention in Evidence
The Anglo-American law of evidence developed in response to the
judiciary's need to ensure that only relevent information presented
in a straightforward nonprejudicial manner reached a jury.' When
a case is tried -to a judge alone, the rules of evidence are relaxed and
a presumption arises that the judge has considered only admissible
evidence in making a ruling.2 In contrast, when a judge presides over
a jury trial, it is his duty to administer the rules of evidence to
exclude evidence which might prevent a jury from reaching a just
result.3 The rules of evidence have also come to serve another pur-
pose. They are used to limit the role of the judge within the adver-
sary system.'
This note will consider the areas where judicial intervention in the
presentation of evidence influences the trial process.' The scope of
a judge's authority in determining preliminary questions of admissi-
bility of evidence will be examined, as well as the judge's ability to
testify, to call and question witnesses, to take judicial notice, and
to summarize and comment on evidence. The boundaries of these
powers under current Illinois law will be explored. Where appropri-
ate, comparison will be made with the Federal Rules of Evidence
and proposals for change will be suggested.
ADMISSIBILITY
Perhaps the major area of judicial influence on the trial process
is the court's power to rule on admissibility of evidence.' Prelimi-
nary questions of admissibility are determined by the court.' The
1. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 180 (1898)
[hereinafter cited as THAYER].
2. People v. Cox, 22 11. 2d 534, 177 N.E.2d 211 (1961); McFail v. Braden, 19 I1. 2d 108,
166 N.E.2d 46 (1960); Drovers Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 55 Ill. App.
3d 953, 371 N.E.2d 855 (1977).
3. THAYER, supra note 1, at 208.
4. While the exclusionary rules of evidence, i.e. the rules on hearsay and relevancy, filter
the information which reaches the jury, most of the rules discussed in this note impose
limitations on powers the judge might otherwise possess to intervene in the trial process.
5. The court's power to influence the result of a trial is not limited to the situations
discussed in this note. For example, no mention has been made of the psychological influence
of the judge's behavior on the jury, nor is the effect of granting a judgment n.o.v. discussed.
See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 1145 (1977) 1hereinafter
cited as LEMPERT & SALTZBURC].
6. See generally LEMPERT & SALTZBURC, supra note 5, at 1133-44.
7. FED. R. EVID. 104(a); PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID 104(a); LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note
5, at 1133; H. CLARK, 4 CALLAGHAN'S ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 5.01, at 3 (1964). For examples of
preliminary questions, see Hoch v. People, 219 111. 265, 279, 76 N.E. 356, 361 (1905) (the
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judge may conditionally admit evidence subject to a motion to
strike if other facts demonstrating its relevance are not introduced.8
If the other evidence is insufficient to establish the relevancy, the
judge may withdraw the issue from the jury's consideration? If the
evidence is conflicting, the issue goes to the jury."' The judge is to
instruct the jury to disregard the conditionally admitted fact if they
do not find that the supporting evidence is proved." It is not neces-
sary, however, for the jury to reach a unanimous verdict on this
preliminary issue."2
Generally, questions of law are for the court while questions of
fact are reserved for the jury.'3 Courts and commentators have, how-
ever, long recognized that at this preliminary stage the court may
appropriately act as trier of both fact and law, even in a jury case."
existence of privileges); People v. Linkogle, 54 Ill. App. 3d 830, 834, 368 N.E.2d 1075, 1078
(1977) (competency of witnesses); and Becker v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 35 Ill. App. 3d
479, 485, 341 N.E.2d 369, 373 (1975) (the admissibility of demonstrative evidence).
While the competency of a witness is decided by the court, when the question is one of
mental capacity, the trend has been toward allowing the witness to testify and then relying
on the jury to weigh the credibility of the evidence. See E. CLEARY et. aL., MCCORMICK'S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvIDENCE § 62, at 140-41 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK (2d ed.)]; 2 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EvI-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 501 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE (3d ed.)]. Therefore the failure of the trial court to hold a hearing to ascertain
mental capacity where it is in question has been held not to be reversible error. People v.
Brooks, 39 Il. App. 3d 983, 350 N.E.2d 831, 823 (1976).
8. Rogers v. Brent, 10 111. 573, 587-89 (1849); FED. R. EVID. 104(b); PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID.
104(b) (final draft). A request for an instruction to disregard may also be proper if the
conditionally admitted evidence is not made relevant. See Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill. App. 2d
323, 331, 173 N.E.2d 209, 213 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 24 Ill. 2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206
(1962); MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 7, at 134-35.
9. Rogers v. Brent, 10 Il. 573, 588 (1849).
10. FED. R. EVID. 104(b), Advisory Comm. Notes. This position is a departure from the
traditional rule that the judge decides all questions of admissibility. See generally 1 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 104[02] at 104-18-20 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as WEINSTEIN]. The current Illinois position on the question of submitting preliminary ques-
tions to the jury is unclear. It is also uncertain whether adoption of proposed ILL. R. Evm.
104(b), which is identical to the federal rule, would require Illnois courts to follow this
procedure which is only mentioned in the federal committee notes and not in the text of the
rule.
11. WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, § 104102] at 104-22-23.
12. Id.
13. IL.. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4(a) (1977); People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 175 N.E. 400
(1931).
14. See THAYER, supra note 1, at 185: "In other words, there is not, and never was, any
such thing in jury trials as an allotting of all questions of fact to the jury. The jury simply
decides some questions of fact."; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2550 at 501: "The admissibility
of a given piece of evidence is for the judge to determine. . . . It follows that, so far as the
admissibility in law depends on some incidental question of fact. . . this also is for the judge
to determine, before he admits the evidence to the jury." [citing inter alia Hoch v. People,
219 Ill. 265, 76 N.E. 356 (1905); Miller v. Metzger, 16 Ill. 390 (1855)].
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Therefore, in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, the judge may
decide certain factual issues which the jury may later be asked to
determine as well. 1
5
In making these preliminary determinations of fact and law, it
appears that the court should not be bound by any of the exclusion-
ary rules of evidence," except those dealing with privilege. 7 The
theoretical justification for this policy is that a judge should not be
subject to the exclusionary rules since they were developed to con-
trol the flow of information to the jury."
If a judge does decide to hear evidence which would normally be
excluded from the jury, he should consider whether to conduct the
15. For example, in a condemnation proceeding, the court decides whether a prior offer
to purchase should be admitted to aid in valuing the land. In ruling on the admissibility of
this evidence, the judge reviews the circumstances surrounding the offer to determine if it
was bona fide. If the judge concludes that the offer was not bona fide, any evidence as to the
price offered will not be admitted. However, if the judge concludes that the circumstances
surrounding the offer demonstrate its bona fides, the price offered will be admitted. The jury,
in deciding whether the offered price reflects the true value of the land, may consider the same
circumstances as did the judge in ruling on admissibility. Although the judge has admitted
the evidence, the jury may still conclude that the price offered should be discounted or even
disregarded in determining the land's value. Kankakee Park Dist. v. Heidenreich, 328 Ill. 198,
204, 159 N.E. 289, 292 (1927).
16. FED. R. EvID. 104(a); PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 104(a) (final draft); MCCORMICK, supra
note 7, § 53 at 121-25 n.91; 1 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, §104[021 at 104-24-25; 5 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1385 at 87 (Chadbourne rev. 1974 & Supp. 1977).
But see Becker v. Quigg, 54 Ill. 390, 395 (1870) (judge should not have relied on affidavits
for proof of title when witnesses could be called in).
17. Maguire & Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to
Admissibility, 36 YALE L.J. 1101, 1101-02 (1927); 1 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, § 1041021 at
104-24-25. The reasons for the distinction between privileges and the other exclusionary rules
is that the policy behind excluding privileged evidence is not to aid the jury in finding the
truth (see text accompanying note 15 supra) but to protect the privileged relationships from
the supposed ill effects of a breach of confidence. However, practical difficulties may arise in
attempting to follow this policy too closely.
It is somewhat difficult to see how the admonition in Rule 104(a) [of the Federal
Rules] that the court is 'not bound by the rules of evidence except those with
respect to privileges' can be followed in ruling on questions of privilege. Certainly,
the common practice of requiring the disclosure of privileged documents to the
court for examination in connection with questions of privilege appears contrary to
this admonition.
C. BRITTON, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 7 (Chi. Bar. Assoc. 1976) [citing 1 WEINSTEIN, supra
note 10, § 104[41, at 104-28-29.]
18. See THAYER, supra note 1, at 509. "This view is reinforced by practical necessity in
certain situations. An item, offered and objected to, may itself be considered in ruling on
admissibility, though not yet admitted into evidence." Advisory Comm. Notes, FED. R. EviD.
104(a). There has been little case law on this point, although it has received scholarly support.
D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 35, at 267 nn.21 & 22 (1977 & Supp. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as LouisE.L & MUELLER]. See also 1 WIGMORE (3d ed.), supra note 7, § 4
at 21, & § 4B at 27 for a discussion of the history and policy of using exclusionary rules of
evidence in administrative and other non-jury proceedings.
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hearing outside the jury's presence." Illinois law generally leaves
this decision within the judge's discretion." However, preliminary
hearings on the voluntariness of a confession must be held away
from the jury.2
The approach taken in the federal and the proposed Illinois rules
is that the hearing must be held away from the jury whenever the
preliminary matter involves the admissibility of a confession or
when the accused party is a witness and so requests.2 The latter
provision, relating to the accused party as witness, has been criti-
cized as being unnecessary for the protection of the rights of the
accused.13 The provision has also been objected to since it may
burden the judicial system through needless duplication of testi-
19. See LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 18, § 35 at 267.
20. Cf. Henrietta Coal Co. v. Campbell, 211 Ill. 216, 228, 71 N.E. 863, 867 (1904) (affirm-
ing that the decision of whether or not to have the jury withdrawn while an offer of proof is
made is within the discretion of the trial judge); cf. People v. Jackson, 98 I11. App. 2d 97, 240
N.E.2d 364 (1968) (upholding conference in chambers to determine ruling on an objection);
cf. Maxwell v. Habel, 92 Ill. App. 510, 512 (1900) (where in dictum the opinion notes that if
the court feels an offer of proof will improperly influence the jury it may order the jury
withdrawn).
21. People v. Rogers, 413 Ill. 554, 563, 110 N.E.2d 201, 205 (1953) (dictum); People v.
Guido, 321 Ill. 397, 411, 152 N.E. 149, 152 (1926) (dictum); People v. Fox, 319 II. 606, 618,
150 N.E. 347, 351 (1925) (dictum); cf. People v. King, 22 Il. App. 3d 66, 71, 316 N.E.2d 642,
646 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 61111. 2d 326, 335 N.E.2d 417 (1975) (hearing outside jury's
presence required for a determination of voluntariness of a statement to be used for impeach-
ment purposes whether inculpatory or exculpatory). See also People v. Caldwell, 39 Ill. 2d
346, 351, 236 N.E.2d 706, 710 (1968) (failure to object in appropriate manner to admission of
evidence waives right to special hearing on voluntariness); People v. Costello, 320 Il1. 79, 103,
150 N.E. 712, 721 (1926) (if no objection is made the defendant's confession is properly
admitted into evidence).
In a bench trial the hearing may be held in conjunction with the trial without a special
recess, People v. Fultz, 32 Ill. App. 3d 317, 334, 336 N.E.2d 288, 301 (1975). Contra
MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 7, § 159 at 351 who suggests that in a bench trial the better
practice would be to hold the hearing before a judge other than the trial judge.
22. FED. R. Evm. 104(c) and PROPOSED ILL. R. EVD. 104(c) read: "Hearings on the admissi-
bility of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings
on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require or,
when an accused is a witness, if he so requests."
23. Hearings out of the presence of the jury are both time consuming and cum-
bersome. In many instances evidence given during such hearings must be repeated
before the jury without adverse effect. . . . We think such a rigid rule is particu-
larly unwise since the consequences of failing to accord an unqualified right to the
defendant are not certain. For example, will this be plain error which produces a
reversal? Must the defendant in every instance when a preliminary matter arises
during the course of a trial expressly waive this right to testify out of the presence
of the jury?...Whether to hold a hearing out of the presence of the jury depends
on the posture of the evidence in each particular case. The determination to hold
such a hearing is best left to the discretion of the judge.
Department of Justice Report 2 on the Federal Rules of Evidence (1971), reprinted in 1
WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, § 104[091 at 104-58-59.
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mony.24 Yet, without the safeguard accorded by the federal rule, the
accused might be reluctant to testify on preliminary matters. 25 Giv-
ing the accused the option of whether or not to testify in front of the
jury on preliminary matters seems most compatible with the princi-
ples underlying the fifth amendment 2 and therefore Illinois should
take a stand that is similar to the federal rule.
COMPETENCE OF JUDGE AS WITNESS
At common law it was within the judge's discretion to decide
whether or not to disqualify himself as a witness.27 The only Illinois
case to address the issue dealt with a post conviction hearing. In
People v. Wilson, 8 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a trial judge
should have refused to preside over a post conviction hearing when
it appeared that he would be called on to testify to an important
matter. This decision seems to place Illinois among those states that
permit a judge to testify as long as the subject of his testimony is
not significant to the determination of the ultimate issue .2 This
position may reflect a concern with the weight the jury will give to
the judge's testimony. As long as the testimony is limited to a for-
mal and undisputed issue30 there may be no prejudice if the jury
gives the judge's testimony undue weight.
Other jurisdictions take a different view. They prohibit the pre-
siding judge from ever taking the witness stand.3' The federal
rules32 and the proposed Illinois Rules33 support this position. This
absolute proscription seems preferable and should be adopted in
Illinois since it would eliminate any impression of judicial partiality
which might arise when the judge acts as a witness.
24. Id.
25. See 1 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, § 104[09] at 104-58. But Weinstein also suggests that
the defendant should be encouraged to waive his right to a hearing away from the jury in
order to avoid repetition of testimony as long as no prejudice will result. Id. at 104-59.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 7, § 68 at 147.
28. 37 II. 2d 617, 230 N.E.2d 194 (1967).
29. MCCORMICK (2d ed), supra note 7, § 68 at 147 n.76.
30. Those states which permit a judge to testify if the matter is not overly important
distinguish between material disputed facts and formal undisputed facts. This distinction is
not always easy to make. Id. § 68 at 147.
31. Id. § 68 at 147 n.76.
32. Id.; FED. R. EvID. 605 reads: "The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that
trial as a witness. No objecton need be made in order to preserve the point."
33. PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID. 605 (final draft) is the same as FED. R. EvID. 605. See note 32
supra.
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POWER OF COURT TO CALL AND INTERROGATE WITNESSES
Under common law, the court had the power to call witnesses
when justice required the witness to be present and neither party
would call him.Y The court's witness rule was invoked primarily to
avoid the voucher rule, which prevented a party from impeaching
and cross-examining his own witness.3 Even where the voucher rule
is no longer in effect, the court's witness rule serves a purpose when
neither party wants to be associated in the jury's mind with an
unreliable witness.3 6
In Illinois, the party requesting the court to call a witness must
show why he cannot vouch for the witness's veracity, that the wit-
ness could offer testimony which is relevant to the direct issues in
controversy, and that a miscarriage of justice might otherwise occur
if the testimony is not brought to the attention of the trier of fact.37
The court may call a witness on its own motion"s and may designate
a witness as a court's witness during the course of questioning. 39
Illinois law regarding the court's power to call witnesses is still in
the process of development. The procedure is used most frequently
in criminal cases. The supreme court, in dicta, has stated that a
judge may call only an eye-witness to a crime.40 The better ap-
proach, however, is that found in cases where the court permitted a
judge to call any witness where neither party would vouch for the
witness, yet the witness had knowledge of material facts which
34. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 7, § 8 at 12-14; 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, § 614[011
at 614-3.
35. At common law a party "vouches for the credibility of his witnesses" and therefore
may not impeach them. The rationale for this rule is that a party chooses his own witnesses
and therefore should not call on untrustworthy witness. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 5,
at 269-70; MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 7, § 38 at 75. Both sources attack this rationale
as unrealistic.
36. "[11f a witness is so untrustworthy that his credibility must be attacked it would
seem preferable to be able to refer to him as 'the Court's witness' when addressing the jury."
D. KRUPP, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 56 (Chi. Bar Assoc. 1976). See also WEINSTEIN, supra
note 10, § 614[02] at 614-5-6.
37. Crespo v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Il. App. 3d 506, 515-16, 354 N.E.2d
381, 388 (1976); accord, People v. Moriarity, 33 Ill. 2d 606, 213 N.E.2d 516 (1966).
38. People v. Crump, 5 Ill. 2d 251, 125 N.E.2d 615 (1955). In some jurisdictions this power
is used to allow the court to call impartial expert witnesses. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note
7, § 8 at 14. See generally, Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American
Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REv. 1, 74-80 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Saltzburg]; Note, The Trial
Judge's Use of His Power to Call Witnesses - An Aid to Adversary Presentation, 51 Nw. U.L.
REV. 761, 764-67 (1957) [hereinafter cited as The Trial Judge's Power to Call Witnessesl.
39. People v. Williams, 22 Ill. 2d 498, 177 N.E.2d 100 (1961); People v. Headrick, 65 II.
App. 2d 169, 212 N.E.2d 102 (1965).
40. People v. McKee, 39 Ill. 2d 265, 235 N.E.2d 625 (1968); People v. Robinson, 14 Ill. 2d
325, 153 N.E.2d 65 (1958); People v. Hundley, 4 Ill. 2d 244, 122 N.E.2d 568 (1954).
[Vol. 10
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would result in a miscarriage of justice if not presented."
Use of a court's witness has been extended reluctantly to civil
cases. 2 The reasons for this reluctance are clearly set forth in Crespo
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.:
During the trial of a criminal case, both court and counsel en-
deavor to arrive at the truth and ascertain all circumstances giving
rise to the commission of the alleged offense in a manner consistent
with the fundamental rights of the accused ....
By way of contrast, in a civil action each side possesses differing
interests in the controversy . . . . [Tihe court should not unnec-
essarily interfere with the trial strategies devised by counsel, and
wide latitude should be extended to the parties in deciding in what
posture their case should be presented to the fact finder. 3
In accord with this philosophy, the court in a civil case should call
a witness only if there is no alternative."
There are several reasons for restricting the use of court called
witnesses in civil and criminal cases. A serious concern is that the
procedure may be abused if it is utilized to introduce the witness's
prior inconsistent statements under the guise of impeachment." At
common law, these statements are inadmissible for substantive pur-
poses because they are hearsay." Yet is is well recognized that juries
41. People v. Dennis, 47 Ill. 2d 120, 265 N.E.2d 385 (1970); People v. Moriarity, 33 Ill. 2d
606, 213 N.E.2d 516 (1966); People v. Siciliano, 4 Ill. 2d 581, 123 N.E.2d 725 (1955); People
v. Touhy, 361 Ill. 332, 197 N.E.849 (1935); People v. Robinson, 46 Ill. App. 3d 713, 361 N.E.2d
138 (1977); People v. Stephens, 13 Ill. App. 3d 642, 301 N.E.2d 89 (1973). Some cases have
held that only prosecution witnesses may be called by the court. See People v. Touhy, 361
Il1. 332, 197 N.E.849 (1935); Carle v. People, 200111. 494, 66 N.E. 32 (1902). But seeE. CLEARY,
HANDBOOK OF ILLINOis EVIDENCE § 6.10 at 90 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as CLEARY1.
However, present usage has expanded the practice to civil cases. Crespo v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Il. App. 3d 506, 354 N.E.2d 381 (1976) (dictum); Green v. Smith, 59
Ill. App. 2d 279, 207 N.E.2d 169 (1965). Contra, Kubisz v. Johnson, 29 Ill. App. 3d 381, 383,
329 N.E.2d 815, 817 (1975), appeal denied, 60 Ill. 2d 597, (1975).
42. See Green v. Smith, 59 Ill. App. 2d 279, 207 N.E.2d 169 (1965); cf. Crespo v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Ill. App. 3d 506, 518, 354 N.E. 2d 381, 390 (1976) (recognizing
possibility that court could call witness in civil case but that it was not suitable in case at
bar.)
43. 41111. App. 3d at 517-18, 354 N.E. 2d at 389-90.
44. See, e.g., Martin v. Brennan, 54 Ill. App. 3d 421, 369 N.E.2d 601 (1977) where the
court held that rather than making a witness a court's witness, a co-plaintiff should be
allowed to cross-examine a witness whose testimony would only be applied to the other
plaintiff.
45. The purpose of calling a court's witness is to bring his testimony before the court for
whatever probative value it might have. Although prior inconsistent statements made by the
witness may be used to impeach his testimony, they should not be used as substantive
evidence. People v. McKee, 39 Ill. 2d 265, 235 N.E.2d 625 (1965); People v. Robinson, 46 I1.
App. 3d 713, 361 N.E.2d 138 (1977); Crespo v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41111. App.
3d 506, 354 N.E.2d 381 (1976).
46. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 7, § 251 at 601.
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are unlikely to distinguish between impeachment evidence and sub-
stantive evidence. 7 When the court calls a witness, both parties
may cross-examine that witness and therefore the opportunities for
this misuse of the evidence are increased."
Another objection to extensive use of the court's power to call
witnesses is that it encroaches on the traditional adversary system
where each party is responsible for presenting its own witnesses. 9
In addition, the jury may give undue weight to the testimony of a
witness called by the court. 50 Finally, a trial court which calls a
witness in a criminal case may violate the due process clause if the
resulting testimony helps the prosecution build its case. 5'
The likelihood of a due process violation increases if the jurisdic-
tion allows a party to impeach his own witness. '5 2 In Illinois, a party
can impeach his own occurrence witness upon a showing of good
faith and. surprise. 3 Therefore, it should generally"' be unnecessary
47. People v. Collins, 49 Ill. 2d 179, 194-95, 274 N.E.2d 77, 85 (1971); LEMPERT & SALTZ-
BURG. supra note 5, at 487. The giving of Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 3.11 (criminal) has
been held insufficient to clarify this distinction. People v. Chitwood, 36 Ill. App. 3d 1017,
1026, 344 N.E.2d 611, 620 (1976).
48. See Crespo v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Ill. App. 3d 506, 516, 354 N.E.2d
381, 388 (1976). In Illinois, a party cannot generally cross-examine his own witness. People
v. Kelly, 39 Ill. App. 3d 190, 194, 350 N.E.2d 163, 167 (1976). A party can, however, cross-
examine his own witness if the court determines that the witness is hostile or unwilling. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 238 (1977). A party can also impeach his own occurence witness by
the use of prior inconsistent statements, if the party can show that he called the witness in
good faith and is surprised by his testimony. Id. A further requirement of a showing of
affirmative damage is sometimes imposed by the court before a party may impeach his own
witness. See People v. Chitwood, 36 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1025, 344 N.E.2d 611, 618 (1976). See
also Tornquist, The Prior Inconsistent Statement: The Illinois Law, The Art, and Things to
Come, 10 Loy. CI. L.J. 381 (1979).
49. Crespo v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41111. App. 3d 506, 518; 354 N.E.2d 381,
390.
50. Id.; Saltzburg, supra note 38, at 66.
51. United States v. Karnes, 531 F.2d 214, 216-17 (4th Cir. 1976), noted in Comment, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1906, 1907 (1976). In Karnes, the Fourth Circuit held that it was a violation of
due process for the court to call two important prosecution witnesses without clearly inform-
ing the jury of the implications of the court-called witness procedure.
52. Where a party may impeach his own witness there is probably no reason for the court
to call a witness, especially since the possible prejudice of having the jury assume that the
witness's testimony is supported by the court outweighs any negligible benefits. To call a
witness in these circumstances would be reversible error. Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1906,
1912 (1976).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1lOA, § 238 (1977).
In United States v. Karnes, the court held that it was unnecessary for the two witnesses to
be called by the trial judge since they could have been impeached by the party which called
them. 531 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1976). The federal common law in effect at the time of the
jury trial in Karnes is only slightly broader than current Illinois law. It required that the
witness be hostile or give testimony inconsistent with his earlier statements before he could
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for Illinois courts to call occurrence witnesses.5 '
The federal rules permit a judge to call a witness on his own
motion or that of either party. 5 Both sides are free to cross-examine
this witness.57 Unlike current Illinois law,5" the federal rule has no
guidelines for determining when a judge may call a witness. This
federal position is consistent with the greater discretion tradition-
ally granted to federal court judges.59
Another possible reason for the absence of guidelines in the fed-
eral provision is that under the federal rules any party can impeach
any witness. 0 This reduces the likelihood that parties will request
the court to call witnesses in order to have the opportunity to im-
peach them and thereby introduce their prior inconsistent state-
ments to the jury. Furthermore, the federal hearsay rule"' provides
be cross-examined and impeached by the party who called him. Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1906, 1907 (1976).
54. An argument could be made for the need to have the court call a witness when no
party wants to be associated with that witness. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. If,
however, the party is entitled to cross-examine and impeach his own witness it is probable
that these acts will serve to alert the jury to the fact that the witness and the party calling
him do not have an identity of interests. Saltzburg, supra note 38, at 70.
55. See generally Saltzburg, supra note 38, at 70. But see United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d
285, 289 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding the court's calling of witnesses under Federal Rule 607
even though the rule allows any party to impeach any witness); but cf. United States v.
Karnes, 531 F.2d 214, 219 (4th Cir. 1976) (Russell, J., dissenting) (saying that the court has
a duty to call important witnesses if the parties refuse.)
56. FED. R. EVID 614(a) reads: "The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of
a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called."
The proposed Illinois Rules of Evidence eliminated rule 614 entirely. The majority indi-
cated that the scope of the court's discretion to call and question witnesses was best left to a
case-by-case determination. PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 614, Comm. Comments (Final Draft). A
minority felt that the federal rule should be adopted and that the failure to do so would
possibly result in an undue curtailment of judicial authority. PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID. 614,
Minority Discussion (Final Draft).
57. FED. R. EVID. 614(a).
58. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
59. This discretion is particularly apparent in the area of the court's ability to sum up
and comment on the evidence. See text accompanying note 162, infra. On the relationship
between the judge's power to call and question witnesses and his power to sum up, see
generally S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 125 (Supp. 1977
& Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as SALTZBURG & REDDEN]; 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10,
§ 614[01] at 614-3; The Trial Judge's Power to Call Witnesses, supra note 38, at 761-63.
60. FED. R. EvID. 607 reads: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party,
including the party calling him." PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 607 requires a showing of surprise
and affirmative damage unless the statements used to impeach are admissible substantively.
61. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) provides that a prior inconsistent statement made under
oath or in a deposition is not hearsay if the witness testifies and is subject to cross-
examination. (Proposed FED. R. EID. 801 (d)(1)(A) would have gone further and not even
required that the prior statement be made under oath.) PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID.
801(d)(1)(A)(Final Draft) requires that the prior statement have been subject to cross-
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that some of a witness's prior statements may be used substantively
as well as for impeachment. Therefore it is no longer prejudicial to
present these statements to the jury under the federal rules. Such
statements are still hearsay in Illinois.2 Since the possibility of jury
misuse of evidence persists, Illinois should not adopt the more lib-
eral federal approach to court called witnesses without concomitant
changes in the Illinois hearsay law.
An Illinois court has limited discretionary authority to question
witnesses. 3 The judge must not comment on the evidence or the
credibility of witnesses and should try to avoid asking questions
which would raise objections. 4 Therefore, court questions are
usually confined to inquiries "designed to elucidate a point, aid an
embarrassed witness, or facilitate the progress of the trial.''61 The
judge's discretion in questioning witnesses may be more freely exer-
cised when the case is tried without a jury.66
Several Illinois cases hold that the failure of counsel to make a
timely objection to a judge's question waives the error.67 However,
the courts have not clearly established what constitutes a timely
objection. In contrast, the federal rule clearly establishes when
objections may be raised. This rule provides that objections to the
calling or interrogation of witnesses may be made immediately or
at the next available moment when the jury is absent."' The advan-
tages of this approach are twofold. First, it lessens the potential for
examination by the party against whom the statement is now being offered as well as requir-
ing the statement to have been made under oath.
62. People v. Gant, 58 111. 2d 178, 183-85, 317 N.E.2d 564, 567-69 (1974); People v. Collins,
49 Ill. 2d 179, 194-98, 274 N.E.2d 77, 85-87 (1971); Corneiller v. School Dist. 152 1/2, 62 Il.
App. 3d 549, 553, 378 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (1978); People v. Spicer, 61 111. App. 3d 748, 758,
378 N.E.2d 169, 176 (1978); Kubisz v. Johnson, 29 Ill. App. 3d 381, 383, 329 N.E.2d 815, 817
(1975).
63. "Occasional questioning without expression of opinion of any controverted question
of fact is within the discretion of the trial court." Bebb v. Yellow Cab Co., 120 Ill. App. 2d
454, 467, 257 N.E.2d 164, 170 (1970).
64. CLEARY, supra note 41, § 6.10 at 90; accord, S. GARD, ILLINoIs EVIDENCE MANUAL § 468
at 590 (1963 & Supp. 1978).
65. CLEARY, supra note 41, § 6.10 at 90. Cf. Adams v. Sane, 41111. 2d 381, 386, 243 N.E.2d
233, 236 (1968) ("a trial judge is not required to sit mute even in a jury trial; he may ask
questions to elicit the truth and clarify the issues").
66. People v. Palmer, 27 Ill. 2d 311, 189 N.E.2d 265 (1963).
67. People v. Banks, 17 Ill. App. 3d 746, 308 N.E.2d 261 (1974) (failure to make timely
objections to court's questions held waived); People v. Headrick, 65 Ill. App. 2d 169, 212
N.E.2d 102 (1965) (failure to object to court called witness held waived). But see People v.
Godbout, 42 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 356 N.E.2d 865 (1976) (objection allowed on appeal because
court abused discretion in asking questions).
68. FED. R. EvID. 614(c) reads: "Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to
interrogation by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the
jury is not present."
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embarrassment which may occur when counsel objects to the
judge's questions when the jury is present. 9 Second, it clarifies
counsel's right to object"' and assures that timely objection is made
so that corrective measures may be taken.7' Illinois should adopt
guidelines similar to those found in the federal rule.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Judicial notice occurs when a judge accepts the truth of certain
facts without requiring that the facts be formally proved.72 Several
problems must be confronted in determining whether judicial notice
should be taken. These difficulties include defining the facts which
are to be noticed, assuring the parties of adequate notice that judi-
cial notice is being taken, and determining whether judicial notice
of a fact should be treated as conclusive proof of that fact. The
procedure is further complicated because the term judicial notice
encompasses several different judicial functions. One use of judicial
notice is sometimes referred to as "jury notice" or "background
facts."73 Judges, like other people, bring into the courtroom certain
69. FED. R. EVID. 614(c), Advisory Comm. Notes.
70. See Goshey v. Dunlap, 16 Ill. App. 3d 29, 305 N.E.2d 648 (1973) (judge refused to allow
counsel to object to court's questions, case remanded for abuse of discretion). See also P.
Marshall, Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1973 REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE 151, 154:
In the years that I was trying cases, on more than one occasion I found it necessary
to object to an interrogation by the court, and on more than one occasion, I have
had judges say to me, "You can't object to my questions." I know that we are
divine, but we are not infallible. If our questions are objectionable, they must be
objected to. There are a number of reviewing court decisions to the effect that if
counsel fails to object to the court's interrogation, error is waived.
71. FED. R. Evio. 614(c), Advisory Comm. Notes.
72. WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, § 200[01] at 200-2. As defined by one Illinois court,
"[ludicial notice denotes the duty and power of a court to accept for purposes of a trial the
truth of a fact, commonly and generally known without proof thereof." Thurman v. Illinois
Dep't of Pub. Aid, 25 111. App. 3d 367, 370, 323 N.E.2d 502, 504 (1974); accord, City of Chicago
v. Williams, 254 11. 360, 98 N.E. 666 (1912).
Another way this concept is often expressed is that " 'judges ought not to be more ignorant
than the rest of mankind' or stated otherwise that 'courts should at least know what every-
one else knows'." Wheeler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 11 Ill. App. 3d 841, 849, 298 N.E.2d 329,
334 (1973); accord, Owens v. Green, 400 Ill. 380, 81 N.E.2d 149 (1948); Theo. B. Robertson
Prod's Co. v. Nudelman, 389 Il. 281, 59 N.E.2d 655 (1945).
Judicial notice can be taken at both the trial and appellate levels. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG,
supra note 5, at 911. "[T]he failure or even refusal of a trial court to take judicial notice of
a fact does not prevent an appellate court from doing so." Wheeler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
11111. App. 3d 841, 852, 298 N.E.2d 329, 337 (1973).
73. McNaughten, Judicial Notice - Excerpts Relating to the Morgan.Wigmore
Controversy, 14 VAND. L. REv. 779, 789-90 (1961) [hereinafter cited as McNaughtenj. For
example, when judges or juries hear the word "car" they do not need evidence to prove "what
a car is" or how it differs generally from a railroad car. FED. R. EVID. 201(a), Advisory Comm.
Notes.
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basic information which they apply in evaluating evidence.7 With-
out allowing for these basic assumptions, it would be nearly impos-
sible to conduct a trial since every fact would have to be proved from
the ground up."5 As long as these extra-record facts are either true
or else irrelevant there is no need for the courts to acknowledge
them."0 Therefore, courts rarely discuss this type of judicial notice.
The process by which a judge determines the law applicable to the
facts of a case is another function of judicial notice.77 The laws of
foreign jurisdictions as well as local ordinances were formerly con-
sidered questions of fact requiring presentation of evidence.', These
matters are now generally covered by statute. Illinois courts of origi-
nal jurisdiction are required to take judicial notice of municipal and
county ordinances within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. 7
They must also take notice of public laws enacted by any state or
territory of the United States."0 Each Illinois appellate court must
take judicial notice of everything that the lower court was required
to notice, including the rules of practice of the lower court.' In
74. The subject of judicial notice, then, belongs to the general topic of legal or
judicial reasoning. It is, indeed, woven into the very texture of the judicial function.
In conducting a process of judicial reasoning, not a step can be taken without
assuming something which has not been proved; and the capacity to do this with
competent judgment and efficiency, is imputed to judges and juries as part of their
necessary mental outfit.
THAYER, supra note 1, at 279-80 (footnotes omitted).
75. FED. R. EVID. 201(a), Advisory Comm. Notes.
76. McNaughten, supra note 73, at 790.
77. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 7, § 335 at 776.
78. Id.
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 48a (1977). However, when the contents of an ordinance is a
material issue in the case, the ordinance must be properly presented to the court. Woods v.
Village of LaGrange Park, 287 Il1. App. 201, 4 N.E. 2d 764 (1936).
If proposed Illinois rule 201 on judicial notice is adopted there might be some overlap
between it and the existing statute. In any conflict between the legislative enactment and
the judicially passed rule, it is uncertain which would prevail. See generally People v. Jack-
son, 69 111. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977); Note, The Bounds of Power: Judicial Rule-Making
in Illinois, 10 Loy. Cm. L.J. 100 (1978).
Federal Rule 201, on which the Illinois rule is modelled, does not apply to judicial notice
of law. The drafters of the federal rule believed that the subject was adequately and more
appropriately covered by the laws on procedure. FED. R. EvD. 201, "Note on Judicial Notice
of Law." See generally MCCORMICK, (2d ed.) supra note 7, § 335 at 782.
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 48a (1977).
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 48b (1977). See generally H. Fins, Judicial Notice - The
Illinois Anomaly, 7 J. MAR. J. OF PRAC. & PRoc. 15 (1973) for a discussion of the disparity
between the limitations imposed on trial courts as opposed to appellate courts and the
anomaly of requiring Illinois courts to take notice of the laws of foreign states and not allowing
them to notice other Illinois ordinances outside their jurisdiction. However, much of Fins'
argument has been rendered moot by the recent decision in People v. Davis, 65 Ill. 2d 157,
357 N.E.2d 792 (1976) which established the right of trial courts to take judicial notice of
earlier proceedings in the same court. See note 96 infra. Davis appears to overrule People v.
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addition, Illinois has adopted the Uniform Judicial Notice of For-
eign Law Act, which requires courts to take notice of the common
law and statutes of all states and territories of the United States."
The law of foreign nations continues to be a question of fact, al-
though one decided by the court.8
Illinois courts may also take judicial notice of earlier proceedings
in the same case." In addition, the courts may take notice of other
proceedings which "involve the same parties and are determinative
of the case sub judice."85
The most common use of the term judicial notice is to describe
the court's acceptance of the truth of a fact which would normally
have to be proved by one of the parties.86 Two broad areas of knowl-
edge are generally recognized as being suitable for this type of judi-
McKinlay, 367 Ill. 504, 11 N.E.2d 933 (1937); People v. Chicago & E. Ill. Ry., 336 Il. 506,
168 N.E. 294 (1929) and other cases which held that the trial judge could only notice the
record of proceedings in the case before the court.
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 48g - 48n (1977). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 48c - 48f
constitutes the Uniform Proof of Statues Act, which provides that any books or pamphlets
published by the authority of the United States or any state, territory, or foreign jurisdiction
shall be prima facie evidence of the statutes so published.
There is no comparable provision of the statute setting forth the basis for recognizing the
common law of other jurisdictions. If there has been no decision by the highest court of the
state, an intermediate appellate court decision must be followed at least if there is no conflict-
ing decision. Moscov v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 387 11. 378, 389, 56 N.E.2d 399, 404-05
(1944).
The National Conference on Uniform State Laws has promulgated new versions of these
Uniform Acts since the passage of the federal rules of evidence. Sections 4.01-.04 (Determina-
tion of Foreign Law) of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act supersedes
the old Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act. § 5.03 supersedes the Uniform Proof of
Statutes Act.
83. Groome v. Freyn Eng'r Co., 374 Il1. 113, 28 N.E.2d 274 (1940); Farah v. Farah, 25 III.
App. 3d 481, 492, 323 N.E.2d 361, 368 (1975); Atwood Vacuum Mach. Co. v. Continental Cas.
Co., 107 Ill. App. 2d 248, 262-3, 246 N.E.2d 882, 890 (1969); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 48k; see
D. Ader, Foreign Law in Illinois Courts, 58 ILL. B.J. 420 (1970).
84. In re Brown, 71111. 2d 151, 155, 374 N.E.2d 209, 211 (1978); Ex rel. Caffey, 63 Ill. App.
3d 214, 216, 379 N.E.2d 884, 886 (1978) (dictum).
85. People v. Davis, 65 Ill. 2d 157, 161, 357 N.E.2d 792, 796 (1976) (trial court properly
took notice of defendant's prior conviction before same court in separate proceeding where
such fact was "capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to sources of
indisputable accuracy" and defendent did not deny the former conviction); accord, People
v. Tucker, 44 Il1. App. 3d 583, 358 N.E.2d 729 (1976). See also Walsh v. Union Oil Co., 53 Ill.
2d 295, 291 N.E.2d 644 (1972) (in suit for royalities based on mineral rights, court should have
noticed related proceedings in which plaintiff's title to deeds in question was declared void);
Badger Mut. Ins. Co. v. Murry, 54 Il1. App. 3d 459, 370 N.E.2d 295 (1977) (in suit by insurance
company seeking declaratory judgment that it did not have to defend insured, trial court
properly looked at pleadings filed by injured party in separate case); Corboy, Has Illinois
Adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence? Maybe Yes, Maybe No, 59 CHI. B. REc. 141 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Corboy] (questioning whether holding in Davis will be narrowly con-
strued).
86. See City of Chicago v. Williams, 254 Ill. 360, 364-65, 98 N.E. 666, 668 (1912).
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cial notice. Facts widely known by reasonably intelligent people
within the community constitute the first area. 7 Illinois courts have
long recognized that matters of general knowledge are appropriate
for judicial notice."' Within this category, the courts have noticed
biological facts, 9 traffic conditions, 0 and geographic facts.'
The second area of knowledge which may be judicially noticed
comprises facts easily determined by "resort to sources of indisput-
able accuracy". 2 Until recently, the Illinois courts have limited the
87. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 7, § 328 at 758. The fact must be generally known
but only within the jurisdiction. Ashland Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Aetna Ins. Co., 18 I1. App.
3d 70, 309 N.E.2d 293 (1973). The fact need not be known by the entire community but only
by well informed people. 222 E. Chestnut St. Corp. v. Board of Appeals, 14 11. 2d 190, 152
N.E.2d 465 (1958).
88. See note 72 supra.
89. See, e.g., Klein v. Department of Registration & Educ., 412 Ill. 75, 105 N.E.2d 758
(1952) where the court recognized that the eyes of spectacle wearers continue to change and
in fact may over a period of years return to normal.
While the basic facts of human conception are of general knowledge, where conception is
claimed to have occurred in a manner "outside of common experience" an expert witness
should be called. Adams v. Kite, 48 Il. App. 3d 828, 363 N.E.2d 182 (1977).
90. It has been noticed that it is the custom to yield the right-of-way to funeral proces-
sions. Sundene v. Koppenhoefer, 343 Ill. App. 164, 98 N.E.2d 538 (1951). An appellate court
has also had occasion to notice that excessively heavy vehicles will damage the roads and pose
a threat to others who use the roads. People v. Linde, 341 Ill. 269, 173 N.E. 361 (1930).
91. The fact that 7956 S. Chicago Ave. is in Chicago was once held not to be a subject of
judicial notice, People v. Strook, 347 I1. 460, 179 N.E. 821 (1932). However, in the interests
of efficiency it has since been held that notice can be taken of the practice of referring to
streets without mentioning the city when a person is speaking of the city he is in at the time.
People v. Pride, 16 Ill. 2d 82, 156 N.E.2d 551 (1959). Thus the practice of taking judicial notice
of street addresses for venue purposes was established. One of the reasons given in Strook
for not taking judicial notice was the court's desire to protect the rights of the accused. The
sensitivity of the Strook court on the issue of due process may be compared with the position
of the Pride court, which stated that to take judicial notice "would be to protect an accused
by the naivety of the court." Id. at 89, 156 N.E.2d at 555.
Courts have also noticed the location of meetings of the general assembly, Owens v. Green,
400 Ill. 380, 81 N.E.2d 149 (1948) and where the first district courts are located, Nashlund v.
Sabade, 39 Ill. App. 3d 139, 350 N.E.2d 90 (1976). An appellate court upheld a trial judge's
decision to notice that the 400 block of State St. in Chicago contains reputable department
stores as well as a wide variety of places of entertainment some of which are frequented by
servicemen and adults of all ages. People v. Biocic, 80 111. App. 2d 65, 224 N.E.2d 572 (1967).
But cf. Sproul v. Springman, 316 Ill. 271, 147 N.E. 131 (1925) (court refused to notice whether
the Kaskaskia River is a navigable stream).
92. McCoRMICK (2d ed.), supra note 7, § 328 at 758. Judicial notice of scientific facts can
be used to establish the reliability of blood tests in determining paternity or intoxication, of
radar, and of handwriting analysis. Id. at 763.
There may be an overlap between this category and that of general knowledge. Some
scientific facts are so basic that they can be classified as items of general knowledge. Thus a
court will notice that due to gravity a railroad car on a sloping track will move downhill unless
propery braked. Woods v. N.W., C. & St. L. R.R., 339 Il1. App. 132, 88 N.E.2d 740 (1949),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 830 (1950).
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application of judicial notice in this context to such facts as dates"
and irrefutable scientific facts. 4
However, influenced by the federal rule on judicial notice, 5 the
Illinois Supreme Court has apparently extended judicial notice to
all facts "capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by re-
sort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.""1
Generally, a judge may take judicial notice of facts of which he
has no personal knowledge. 7 He may use any information at his
disposal 8 or that which is presented by the parties" in deciding
whether or not to take notice of a fact.'" However, a judge may
refuse to notice a fact if the party requesting the notice has not
brought the necessary information to the court's attention. 0'
93. See, e.g., Lange v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 273 Ill. App. 356 (1934) where
the court relied on a calendar in noticing that a certain date did not fall on a Saturday.
94. Cook Co. Dep't of Environmental Control v. Tomar Indus., 29 Ill. App. 3d 751, 754,
331 N.E.2d 196, 199 (1975); Nicketta v. National Tea Co., 338 I1. App. 159, 162, 87 N.E.2d
30, 31 (1949).
95. FED. R. EvID. 201(b) reads: "A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction
of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID. 201(b) is identical.
96. People v. Davis, 65 Ill. 2d 157, 161, 357 N.E.2d 792, 796 (1976). It is not clear whether
the holding in this case will be broadly construed. Although the court cited the text of the
federal rule, it refused to adopt it, prefering to wait for the report of the Illinois Committee
on Rules of Evidence. Given the subsequent inaction of the supreme court in regard to the
proposed rules, it is possible that the case will be narrowly construed and limited to the fact
situation it presented. The Davis decision has not been extended to a wide variety of situa-
tions. The cases which have relied on Davis have all been criminal matters. People v. Ford,
44 Ill. App. 3d 926, 358 N.E.2d 1274 (1976) and People v. Tucker, 44 111 App. 3d 583, 358
N.E.2d 729 (1976) both involved fact situations similar to Davis. In People v. Middleton, 43
Ill. App. 3d 1030, 357 N.E.2d 1238 (1976), the taking of judicial notice was also supported on
non-Davis grounds. See also Corboy, supra note 85, at 141.
97. City of Rock Island v. Cuinely, 126 111. 408, 414, 18 N.E. 753, 757 (1888); THAYER, supra
note 1, at 308.
98. City of Rock Island v. Cuinely, 126 Ill. 408, 414, 18 N.E. 753, 757 (1888); Nicketta v.
National Tea Co., 338 Ill. App. 159, 162, 87 N.E.2d 30, 31 (1949); THAYER, supra note 1, at
308.
99. Nicketta v. National Tea Co., 338 Ill. App. 159, 162, 87 N.E.2d 30, 31 (1949); THAYER,
supra note 1, at 308.
100. However, it is important to realize that a judge cannot use his own personal experi-
ence or knowledge in deciding a case unless that information is a proper subject for judicial
notice. See Drovers Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 55 I11. App. 3d 953,
957, 371 N.E.2d 855, 858 (1977); McGurn v. Brotman, 25 Ill. App. 2d 294, 298, 167 N.E.2d
12, 14 (1960); People v. Burt, 257 Ill. App. 60, 63 (1930). Cf. People v. Gilbert, 68 111. 2d 252,
259, 369 N.E.2d 849, 852 (1977) where the court stated that a judge should not notice informa-
tion gleaned from private experiments. But see Edward v. Peabody Coal Co., 121 I11. App.
2d 298, 310, 257 N.E.2d 500, 506 (1970) (a trial judge may use his own experience in interpret-
ing a matter of law when deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings).
101. McCallister v. Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co., 287 Ill. 246, 122 N.E. 468 (1919);
Town of Normal v. Witham, 91 Ill. App. 2d 262, 233 N.E.2d 576 (1968); Kabler v. Marchi,
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Certain case law suggests that when a judge becomes aware of a
fact suitable for judicial notice, he should not ignore it.102 In order
to clarify this proposition, Illinois should adopt the approach taken
in the federal and proposed Illinois rule on judicial notice. The
rule'03 makes judicial notice mandatory when a party requests it
and provides the judge with the necessary information. All other
decisions on whether to take judicial notice are left to the court's
discretion. 04 These provisions are desirable because they are consis-
tent with objectives of procedural fairness and judicial economy. 0 5
Since it is generally agreed that the taking of judicial notice ren-
ders a matter indisputable, failure to provide the opposing party
with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard may be a
denial of due process. 06 Illinois courts have not confronted the issue
of adequate notice. However, the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law Act'07 includes a provision which requires that advance notice
be given before a judge may take judicial notice of a foreign law. '18
This provision might be considered as a model for all areas of judi-
cial notice. 09
The federal and the proposed Illinois rules suggest an alternative
approach to the due process problem. While the rule contains no
formal provision for notification,"0 it does permit an opposing party
to request an opportunity to be heard."' If the party has not received
307 Ill. App. 23, 29 N.E.2d 854 (1940); Woods v. Village of LaGrange Park, 287 Ill. App. 201,
4 N.E.2d 764 (1936).
102. Jackie Cab Co. v. Chicago Park Dist., 366 Ill. 474, 9 N.E.2d 213 (1937); Thurman v.
Illinois Dep't of Pub. Aid, 25 Ill. App. 3d 367, 323 N.E.2d 502 (1974), appeal denied, 58 Ill.
2d 599 (1975).
103. FED. R. EVID. 201(d) and PROPOSED ILL. R. EVlD. 201(d) (Final Draft) read: "A court
shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary informa-
tion."
104. FED. R. EVID. 201(c) and PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 201(c)(Final Draft) read: "A court
may take judicial notice, whether requested or not."
105. See generally FED. R. EvD. 201(c)-201(d), Advisory Comm. Notes; CLEARY, supra
note 41, § 3.7 at 45-46.
106. CLEARY, supra note 41, § 3.7 at 45; 1 Weinstein, supra note 10, § 201105] at 201-35;
Special Evidence Edition, Judicial Notice, 27 ARK. L. REv. 171, 184 (1973).
107. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 48g-48n(1977).
108. Id. § j reads:
Any party may also present to the trial court any admissible evidence of such laws,
but, to enable a party to offer evidence of the law in another jurisdiction or to ask
that judicial notice be taken thereof, reasonable notice shall be given to the adverse
parties either in the pleadings or otherwise.
109. CLEARY, supra note 41, § 3.7 at 46.
110. See FED. R. EvID. 201(e), Advisory Comm. Notes.
111. FED. R. EvID. 201(e) and PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID. 201(e)(Final Draft) read: "A party
is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking
judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the
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adequate prior notification, the hearing may be held after the judge
has taken judicial notice."2
It is unclear whether the federal rule or the Judicial Notice of
Foreign Law Act provides the more efficient resolution of due pro-
cess questions. If a judge is often forced to reconsider a judicially
noticed fact because the opposing party did not receive prior notifi-
cation, the court's time will have been wasted. On the other hand,
the decision to take judicial notice is often uncontested." :' There-
fore, a formal notification process may be unnecessary and time
consuming."'
Prior notification may be more essential in the area of judicial
notice of foreign law. Without adequate notification, parties would
not be prepared to conduct the trial on the basis of the laws of
another jurisdiction. The federal rule may be more appropriate
when considering judicial notice generally, since so many noticed
facts are uncontested. Therefore, Illinois should consider adopting
the federal approach in all areas not covered by the Uniform Act.
In any consideration of judicial notice a distinction must be
drawn between legislative and adjudicative facts. Adjudicative facts
relate to a specific case - "who did what, where, when, how, and
with what motive.""' 5 Legislative facts are those used by courts to
create law or policy or to interpret statutes."' The distinction be-
tween these two types of facts becomes important when considering
two related areas of controversy surrounding the use of judicial no-
tice.
There has been considerable debate as to whether judicial notice
should be taken only of indisputable facts and whether evidence
request may be made after judicial notice has been taken."
112. Id.
113. See generally Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 945, 947 (1955) [hereinafter
cited as Davis, 55 COLUM.1.
114. Id.
115. Davis, 55 COLUM., supra note 113, at 952. Two examples of adjudicative facts are the
weekday in which a certain date fell, Lange v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 273 I1. App.
356 (1934) and the commercial environment around defendant's store in downtown Chicago,
People v. Biocic, 80 111. App. 2d 65, 224 N.E.2d 572 (1967). Courts are fairly reluctant to notice
most adjudicative facts because they tend to be important to the outcome of the trial. See
CLEARY, supra note 41, § 3.1 at 38.
116. Davis, 55 COLUM., supra note 113, at 952. Examples of legislative facts are that
densely populated cities present difficult problems which require special legislative solutions,
Rincon v. License Appeal Comm'n, 62 Ill. App. 3d 600, 605, 378 N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (1978);
that eyes continue to change, thus justifying the requirement that optometric records be
preserved for three years, Klein v. Department of Registration and Educ., 412 I1. 75, 80-81,
105 N.E.2d 758, 762 (1952) and that the damage to property and the danger caused by extra
heavy vehicles using the roads supported reasonableness of the state's restrictions on such
use, People v. Linde 341 I1. 269, 275, 173 N.E. 361, 363 (1930).
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should be admitted to controvert a judicially noticed fact. Illinois
currently takes the position that a fact which is the subject of judi-
cial notice should be indisputable"7 and no further evidence may be
presented to controvert the fact."" This point of view has the sup-
port of Professor Morgan."' The opposing view is that judicial notice
should be taken whenever it is convenient, and that parties should
be given some opportunity to controvert the judicially noticed
fact.'20 The leading exponent of this position is Professor Davis.'
It was Professor Davis who first developed the distinction between
legislative and adjudicative facts.'2 According to the Davis model
of judicial notice this distinction is just one of three variables to be
considered by the judge in deciding whether to take judicial no-
tice. 2 3 In addition to considering whether a fact is legislative or
adjudicative, the court should also consider whether it is more or
less disputable, and how critical it is to the determination of the
controversy. 24 These factors are also to be considered by the judge
in deciding what type of hearing to hold on the propriety of taking
judicial notice. 2 5 In the case of a disputed adjudicative fact that is
critical to the outcome, Davis feels that the parties should have the
opportunity to present evidence to controvert noticed fact.' 2 On the
other hand, he contends that a judge should be able to notice any
legislative facts he believes to be true, provided that he offers the
parties a chance to contest the taking of notice by informal oral
117. Sproul v. Springman, 316 Ill. 271, 279, 147 N.E. 131, 135 (1925); accord, Bowman
Dairy Co. v. Lyons, 2 Ill. 2d 625, 2 N.E.2d 1 (1954).
118. Nicketta v. National Tea Co., 338 Ill. App. 159, 162, 87 N.E.2d 30, 31 (1948).
119. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REv. 269 (1944) [hereinafter cited as Morgan].
This position is also espoused by Professor McNaughten. See note 64 supra.
120. Davis, Judicial Notice, 1969 LAW & Soc. ORDER 509, 515 [hereinafter cited as
Davis].
121. Id; Davis, 55 COLUM., supra note 113. Professor Davis draws strong support from the
writings of Professor Thayer and Wigmore. See generally THAYER, supra note 1, at 308-09; 9
WiGMORE (3d ed.), supra note 7, § 2567 at 535-36.
122. Davis, 55 COLUM., supra note 113, at 952.
123. Id.:
The principal variables are (a) whether the facts are close to the center of the
controversy between the parties or whether they are background facts at or near
the periphery, (b) whether they are adjudicative or legislative facts, and (c) the
degree of certainty or doubt- whether the facts are certainly indisputable, probably
indisputable, probably debatable or certainly debatable.
124. Id.
125. The four possible types of hearings are: (1) a full trial; (2) presentation of argument
and information before notice is taken; (3) argument after notice is taken; (4) no presentation.
Davis, supra note 120, at 515.
126. Davis, 55 COLUM., supra note 113, at 984.
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presentation or in writing.'2
The Davis approach stresses that judicial notice should be used
as a tool to expedite the trial process.'25 It recognizes that courts do
occasionally take notice of disputable facts. 121 Professor Morgan, on
the other hand, argues that a fact once noticed should be indisputa-
ble,'30 regardless of whether it is legislative or adjudicative.1. , He
believes that to allow judicial notice of disputable facts in the name
of efficiency is to confuse it with rebuttable presumptions. '2 He
concedes, however, that the initial question of whether to notice a
fact is subject to dispute. 33 Therefore, the only real difference be-
tween the Morgan and Davis positions may lie in the determination
of when a judicially noticeable fact may be disputed.' 31
The drafters of Federal Rule 201 on judicial notice apparently
tried to work a compromise between the Morgan and Davis theories.
They adopted the Morgan position that facts should be virtually
indisputable in order to be noticed' 35 but they limited application
127. Davis, supra note 120, at 527. The type of hearing is discretionary with the judge.
Id.
128. Id. at 513. The objective of judicial notice should be "the achievement of the maxi-
mum of convenience that is consistent with procedural fairness." Id. See THAYER, supra note
1, at 309.
129. Davis, supra note 120, at 519-23. See note 108 supra.
130. Morgan, supra note 119, at 279. Morgan cites cases where evidence contrary to a
judicially noticed fact was not allowed. In those cases where the decision not to admit con-
trary evidence was overruled, the appellate courts had also determined that the facts involved
were not proper material for judicial notice. Id. at 285. He maintains that "[tihere is not a
single decision reversing, and it is believed not a single judicial expression disapproving, the
action of a trial judge in rejecting evidence of a matter held by the appellate court to be a
proper subject of judicial notice." Id.
131. See id. at 284-86; MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 7, at 774 n.42.
132. Morgan, supra note 119, at 286.
133. Id. at 287.
134. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, § 201[07] at 200-44-45 suggesting that it makes little
difference whether evidence is allowed to dispute a judicially noticed fact or a hearing is held
to determine whether a fact should be noticed as long as the jury is not included in the
process.
135. FED. R. EviD. 201(b). See note 95 supra for text of rule.
Proposed Illinois Rule 201 is identical to the federal rule except for subsection (g) on
instructing the jury. The federal rule provides that in civil cases "the court shall instruct the
jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed." In proposed Illinois Rule 201(g) the
words "may advise" are substituted for "shall instruct" to avoid giving undue emphasis to
the judicially noticed fact by requiring a formal instruction. PRoPOsED ILL. R. Evm. 201,
Committee Comments (Final Draft). The rationale behind Federal Rule 201(g) was that
judicial notice of an adjudicative fact is conclusive and that no evidence should be admitted
in disproof. FED. R. EvID. 201(g), Advisory Comm. Notes. This is in accord with current
Illinois law. See notes 117 and 118 supra and accompanying text. The substitution of "may"
for "shall" in the proposed Illinois rule, however, seems to make judicial notice less than
conclusive.
In criminal cases the federal rule provides that "the court shall instruct the jury that it
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of the rule to adjudicative facts. 3 " The drafters acknowledged the
Davis contention that some disputable facts may properly be the
subject of judicial notice, 3 7 but restricted such notice to facts within
the legislative sphere. 3 However, the drafters declined to adopt a
provision which would regulate judicial notice of legislative facts
because they felt it was an area which requires greater flexibility
than a rule could provide. 39
It is uncertain whether the federal rule's reliance upon the distinc-
tion between legislative and adjudicative facts was an optimal reso-
lution of the Morgan-Davis debate. While this distinction may be
helpful when used in combination with the other facts suggested by
Davis" to determine whether judicial notice should be taken, it is
unsuitable when used as a rigid guide to determine whether a fact
falls within the scope of the federal or the proposed Illinois rule. In
many instances, the distinction between legislative and adjudica-
tive facts is difficult to draw and one fact may contain characteris-
tics of both categories.''
Once a court has determined that a fact is legislative and there-
fore outside the rule it has complete discretion in deciding whether
to notice that fact. Judicial notice of a legislative fact may be deter-
minative of the ultimate issue in a case." 2 Thus whether a fact is
legislative or adjudicative may become a critical issue under the
may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed." FED. R. EvID.
201(g). Subsection (g) as drafted by the advisory committee did not distinguish between
criminal and civil cases. However, the House of Representatives made the change because it
felt that binding jury instructions would be in conflict with the spirit of the sixth amendment.
H.R. REP. No. 650, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1973). See generally LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra
note 18, § 60, at 495-96. Moore & Bendix, Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J.
9, 16 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Moore & Bendix]. The proposed Illinois rule again substi-
tutes the words "may advise" for "shall instruct" in regard to criminal instructions. Proposed
ILL. R. EVNID. 201(g) (Final Draft).
136. FED. R. EvID. 201(a) and PROPOSED ILL. R. Evm. 201(a)(Final Draft) read: "This rule
governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts." Legislative and evaluative (background)
facts are not subject to Rule 201. FED. R. EvID. 201(a), Advisory Comm. Notes. Neither is
judicial notice of law governed by this rule. FED. R. Evw. 201, Advisory Comm. Notes.
137. FED. R. EvID. 201(a), Advisory Comm. Notes.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See text accompanying notes 124 and 125 supra.
141. See LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 18, § 56, at 405-06, 410-14; SALTZBURG & RED-
DEN, supra note 38, at 61: "In fact, it may be necessary to remind Trial Judges that Davis'
dichotomy may be a useful tool, but it is dangerous to use the tool as if it were a sharply
honed device designed to split hairs."
142. For an example of judicial notice of legislative facts which went to the heart of the
issue on trial see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) where the Supreme
Court utilized extra-record sources to support its finding that separate education was inher-
ently unequal.
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federal and proposed Illinois rule on judicial notice. Yet under the
rule this decision is made by the judge alone with no opportunity
for the parties to be heard."'
On the other hand, the Morgan concept had been to restrict judi-
cial discretion by only allowing indisputable facts to be noticed."'
But the federal rule only applies this standard to adjudicative facts.
By leaving judicial notice of legislative facts'45 unregulated, the rule
may open the door to greater use and/or abuse of judicial discre-
tion.'
Better control over judicial discretion may have been achieved by
adoption of the Davis approach. This approach recognizes that
courts do take judicial notice of disputable facts and provides guide-
lines to be used whenever notice is taken. Although these standards
are broad, they at least provide a check on use of judicial discretion
in taking judicial notice."7
If Illinois were to adopt the legislative-adjudicative distinction as
it is used in the federal rules, the courts could be obliged to focus
on a distinction which may be difficult to make and which would
leave a large area of judicial notice unregulated. Rather than follow-
143. Once the judge decides that a fact is legislative, he does not have to follow the
procedure for a hearing set out in Federal Rule 201(e) and Proposed Illinois Rule 201(e). The
parties may not even become aware that the judge has noticed a legislative fact until the
decision has been handed down.
144. See Morgan, supra note 119, at 292-94; Roberts, Judicial Notice: An Exercise in
Exorcism, 19 N.Y.L.F. 745, 752-54 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Roberts]. The article ties the
Morgan view to a fear of judicial discretion dating back to the early New Deal days.
145. Davis, supra note 120, at 525-26, concludes that three-quarters of judicially noticed
facts are legislative. Roberts, supra note 144, at 758, also minimizes the importance of adjudi-
cative facts:
In fact, none of the evidence casebooks used today contain a single adjudicative fact
example that cannot be rationalized just as easily on relevancy grounds. Bluntly
put, the greatest advance along the lines of codifying evidence will be by deleting
at once even the rump of judicial notice still surviving in the proposed Federal Rules
or any other rules of evidence.
146. SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 38, at 60:
The most serious problem with Rule 201 may be its total failure to address legisla-
tive facts. While we have no quarrel with either the basic distinction between
adjudicative and legislative facts or with the need to treat them differently for
purposes of judicial notice, we are greatly troubled by the Advisory Committee's
Note that it is acceptable for courts to take judicial notice of material legislative
facts without affording the parties an opportunity to be heard. . . .But when a
Judge departs from the theories, evidence, and arguments of the parties to embrace
a new approach we favor participation by the parties.
Cf. 1 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, § 200[03] at 200-15 n.12, ("a judge's legislative functions lie
outside the province of the law of evidence").
147. See THAYER, supra note 1 at 309: "This function [judicial notice] is indeed a delicate
one; if it is too loosely or ignorantly exercised it may annul the principles of evidence and
even of substantive law."[footnote omitted].
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ing the federal code, Illinois should adopt a rule which applies the
Davis approach. The courts should determine the factors to be con-
sidered in all cases where the judge must decide whether to take
judicial notice. It would be unnecessary, however, to take the ex-
treme view proposed by Davis that a judicially noticed fact may be
controverted by the presentation of evidence at trial.", Providing
the opposing party with some opportunity for a hearing on the pro-
priety of taking notice should be sufficient.
JUDICIAL COMMENT
The power of the court to comment on and sum up' the evidence
existed at common law. 50 Beginning in the colonial period, a dis-
trust of the judiciary developed which eventually led most states to
change the common law so that judges would no longer have the
right to comment on or sum up the evidence.' In Illinois, as in most
states, 52 the trial judges have been divested of these powers. 53
The Illinois Supreme Court has upheld against a constitutional
attack limitations prohibiting a judge from commenting on and
summarizing the evidence. In People v. Kelly, 5 ' the prosecution
argued that these limitations constituted a deprivation of trial by
jury. Trial by jury, they contended, meant trial as it was known at
common law, where the judge took an active role in guiding the jury
148. Davis apparently does not envision that the parties will be able to contest a judicially
noticed fact before the jury in a jury trial. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, § 2011071 at 201-
44.
149. Summary is used to describe the judge's recital of the evidence. Comment is the
power to express an opinion on the merit or weight of the evidence. Saltzburg, supra note 38,
at 22. Although the power to sum up has been preserved separately from the power to
comment in some states, see Wright, Instructions to the Jury: Summary Without Comment,
1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 177, 178 [hereinafter cited as Wright, WASH. U.L.Q.]. The two powers
tend to overlap and for most purposes can be discussed interchangeably. See Saltzburg, supra
note 38, at 22; 1 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, § 107[021 at 107-23-24.
150. WIGMORE (3d ed.), supra note 7, § 2551 at 503-05.
151. WEINSTEIN, supra note 13, at § 107[01], at 107-12-13. In the colonial period judges
were mistrusted as paid servants of the crown. Dislike of judges, who were often ill-trained
laymen, continued in the early federal period. Beginning with a statute passed in North
Carolina in 1796, the practice of limiting the judge's powers to comment on and sum up the
evidence spread through the states. Id.
152. Wright, The Invasion of Jury: Temperature of the War, 27 TEmP. L.Q. 137, 137 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as Wright, TEMP. L.Q.]; Wright, WASH. U.L.Q., supra note 149, at 178.
The states which allow neither summary nor comment are: Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washing-
ton, West Virginia. Wright TEMP. L.Q., supra, 158, 161.
153. People v. Schoos, 399 Ill. 527, 78 N.E.2d 245 (1945).
154. 347 Ill. 221, 179 N.E. 898 (1932). See also People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634
(1934).
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to an understanding of both the facts and the law of the case.'55
Although the majority opinion in the case rejected this argument, a
vigorous dissent suggests that the claim was not without merit.'5
The restriction on judicial comment is reflected in the well de-
fined limitations which have developed in regard to the giving of
jury instructions. Under current Illinois law'57 the judge's duty is to
give clear instructions as to the law which is applicable to the facts
of the case.' 8 These instructions must be in writing unless the par-
ties consent to oral instructions.'59 If an Illinois Pattern Jury Instruc-
tion fits the case, it must be given.' 0 The judge is not even to answer
a question posed by the jury, if to do so would invade the jury's
province of weighing the facts.''
In contrast to the state courts, the federal judiciary continues to
have the powers to comment on and sum up the evidence, at least
in theory.'62 In practice, however, federal judges are more likely to
follow the example of the state judiciary.' 3 Perhaps because of their
training under state law, federal judges rarely use their power to
comment on the evidence, and summarize the evidence only slightly
more often than their counterparts in those states which allow sum-
155. 347 Ill. at 224, 179 N.E. at 899.
156. People v. Kelly, 34 111. 221, 179 N.E. 898 (1932). De Young, J., also wrote a dissenting
opinion in People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934).
157. Current Illinois law with regard to the giving of jury instructions continues un-
changed from the 19th century. Wright, TEMP. L.Q., supra note 152, at 153-55. Although the
1933 Civil Practice Act made several changes directed at giving the judge greater freedom in
preparing a charge to the jury, the reforms were quickly repealed. The most notable of these
attempted reforms was that the instructions were to be in the form of a continuous narrative.
In 1935, § 67 of the Act was restored to its original form and it is that version which is
preserved today, with few changes. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 67 (Smith-Hurd, 1977) (Histori-
cal & Practice Note); Wright, TEMP L.Q., supra note 152, at 154; Wright, WASH. U.L.Q., supra
note 149, at 154.
158. People v. Dordies, 60 Ill. App. 3d 621, 377 N.E.2d 245 (1978); Goodrick v. Bassick
Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 447, 374 N.E.2d 1262 (1978); LeMaster v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac.
R.R., 35 I1. App. 3d 1001, 343 N.E.2d 65 (1976).
159. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 67(1) (1977). Written instructions are read aloud verbatim
from a text prepared in advance. Wright, WASH. U.L.Q., supra note 149, at 183-85.
160. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l1A, § 239 (1977).
161. Department of Public Works & Bldgs. v. Roehrig, 45 11. App. 3d 189, 359 N.E.2d
752 (1976); Yanders v. Cline, 96 Il. App. 2d 204, 238 N.E.2d 425 (1968).
162. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899); 1 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, §
107101] at 107-2-4; 9 WIGMORE (3d ed.), supra note 7, § 2551 at 507; Moore & Bendix, supra
note 135, at 13-14 (1974). See generally PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 105, Summing up and Com-
ment by the Judge, cited in 51 F.R.D. 315, 328 (1971). This rule would have codified existing
federal law. Congress, although recognizing that the power to comment and summarize ex-
isted, deleted the proposed rule in deference to state law. Moore & Bendix, supra note 135,
at 14, H.R. REP. No. 5463, 93rd Cong., 2d Seass. (1974). The proposed Illinois Rules of
Evidence do not include a rule on summation and comment.
163. 9 WiGMORE (3d ed.), supra note 7, § 2551 at 507.
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mary but no comment.' 4
There has been considerable national support among commenta-
tors and some practicing attorneys for a return to a more active role
for state judges.' 5 Those in favor of judicial comment tend to be
influenced by the English trial process where the judge retains the
full common law powers to comment on and summarize the evi-
dence. The proponents of judicial comment argue that since the
judge is the only impartial lawyer involved in the trial process, he
should have a special role in guiding the untrained jury to the right
conclusion.'67
However, there are equally strong policy arguments for continuing
the status quo in the state courts.'6 The opponents of judicial com-
ment appear less concerned with departures from the historical role
of the judge and more concerned with protecting the American ad-
versary system.' 9 The most important features of the American
system are that it provides the parties with a forum where they can
be heard and it results in a decision based on the strength of the case
as presented by adversaries.'75 Accordingly, the jury is viewed as an
important safeguard against the possibility of too much judicial
intervention.'7 ' The judge should therefore be limited to those meth-
ods of directing the trial which have minimal influence on the
jury.' 2 This view represents the current position of Illinois law, and
a return to judicial comment should be avoided since it may inter-
fere with the decision-making process of the jury.
CONCLUSION
Two themes dominate the discussion of judicial intervention. The
first centers upon the judge, as the administrator of justice, playing
an active role in the course of a trial. It is his duty to see that the
164. KAL~VN & ZmssL, THE AmRscAN JuRY (1966), cited in 1 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10,
§ 107[011 at 107-10.
165. THAYER, supra note 1, at 188 n.2.; 1 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, § 1071011 at 107-19-
20; 9 WI.MORE, supra note 7, § 2551a at 509-17; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 8, Comment
(1942) (reporting a study carried out in 1927 by The Commonwealth Fund which canvassed
the opinions of 1565 attorneys). See generally Wright, TEMP. L.Q., supra note 152, at 137-41.
There is also a feeling that the federal judiciary should not continue to follow the restrictive
position taken by the states. See 9 WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2551 at 508.
166. See THAYER, supra note 1, at 188 n.2; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2551 at 503.
167. 1 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, § 107[011 at 107-19; Holtzoff, Modem Trends in Trial
by Jury, 16 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 27, 33 (1959).
168. See Saltzburg, supra note 38, at 34-46.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 13-19.
171. Id. at 19-21.
172. Id. at 46-52.
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system works so that the right result is reached. As part of this
function, the judge determines which evidence is admissible and
which facts should be judicially noticed. He may also call and ques-
tion witnesses and in some jurisdictions he may be expected to
comment on and summarize the evidence for the jury.
In contradiction to this theme is the notion that the adversary
system needs protection from the potentially overwhelming influ-
ence of the judiciary, especially in jury trials. In some instances,
safeguarding the trial system requires a departure from common
law traditions, such as where a presiding judge is prohibited from
taking the witness stand or from commenting on the evidence.
Other areas, such as judicial notice and calling and questioning of
witnesses require that appropriate guidelines be formulated to con-
trol the exercise of judicial discretion.
While the federal system has tended to emphasize the role of the
judge, Illinois has generally been more concerned with limiting judi-
cial intervention in the adversary system. Although both positions
have merit, protection of the adversary system and trial by jury
seems to be the more democratic ideal.
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